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Mr.  Chairman, 
It is a  pleasure for me  to  be  here  today. 
For whilst  I  have  addressed  the Council 
~or Foreign Relations  in New  York  and  in 
Chicago  this  is the ~irst time  I  have had 
the opportunity of doing  so  in Washington. 
My  pleasure at being here is however  some-
what  tempered  by  the reluctance with which 
I  approach the  subject of my  address.  As 
you know  I  am  listed to  talk on the subject 
of "The Atlantic Alliance  - a  fractured 
relationship  :  Question Mark,
11  which in 
itself seems  to answer  the  question rather 
than pose it.  For  there can be no  doubt 
that whilst relations between the United 
States and Western Europe have not  been 
broken off they are in somewhat  of a 
battered condition. 
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That  I  feel  somewhat  depressed  ovl~1:·  this 
situation is easily explained when  I  tell 
that for all of my  aqult life I  have  been 
deeply committed  to the maintenance  and 
strengthening of the Western Alliance and 
particularly of  NATO  and  as  a  good  demo-
cratic Socialist have  been bitterly opposed 
to  the expansionist objectives.of Soviet 
Imperialism.  I  therefore find it not 
only depressing  but  somewhat  ironic that 
the  principle strain on the Western 
Alliance at the  present  time  is disagree-
ment  between the United States and many 
Western European countries over  how  \ve 
should handle  the Soviet Union. 
But  before  I  look at the  specific issues 
that are placing strains on  the Alliance 
I  would  like to say  something about  the 
current international economic  situation 
as we  perceive it in Europe.  In economic 
terms  Europe  is going  through its worst 
period since World  War  II;  principally 
as  a  result of the Opec  price rise in 1973 
( 
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and  1978  we  find  ~lves in the midst 
of a  major  recession.  This  can  perhaps  be 
be~t highlighted  by  relating it to the 
levels of unemployment.  In the  Ten 
countries of the Europearr Economic  Community 
there were  some  6  million unemployed  in 
1978;  there are  11  million unemployed  in 
1982  and it is realistic to assume  that 
there will be  15  million by  1985.  Our 
percentage unemployed  is now  approaching 
12%  of our workforce.  This  is having  a 
most damaging effect on European society 
for all sorts of reasons  but particularly 
because of the horrible memories  of the 
slump of the  20s  and  the  30s  in Europe. 
The  pursuit of full  employment  became  one 
of the principal goals  of most,  if.not 
all European Governments  in the post-war 
period.  As  a  result of this in the  25 
years  following World  WAR  II the level of 
unemployment  in Europe remained at a 
very  low figure  indeed.  Most  European 
Governments  sought  to keep unemployment 
down  to  between  2/3%  whereas  in the 
United States it was  generally regarded 
. I . 
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that a  figure of between  5/7_%  was  :::..n 
acceptable level of unemployment.  Not 
only was  full  employment  in Europe  a 
reality but  the  two  decades  before  the 
early  70s  saw us  experiencing a  period of 
unprecedented  economic  development.  ·In 
a  phrase Europe  was  prosperous  and  at 
work.  Now  it is far  less prosperous  and 
many  are unemployed. 
I  believe that it is important to recog-
nise the current economic difficulties and 
of course this applies  to  the United States 
who  are also not exactly experiencing an 
economic  boom,  because  I  believe it does 
add  additio~al strains on international 
relations.  For  example  the European 
Economic  Community  is currently in major 
disagreement with the United States over 
allegations of the dumping  of steel  by 
European manufacturers  in United States 
markets.  Similarly we  are doing battle 
with the United States Administration 
over  the marketing of European agricultural 
exports.  The  point  I  wish to make  is that 
10  years  ago  when  we  were all experiencing 
a  measure of economic  prosperity n:::ither 
./. 
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of these  issues would  have  been regarded 
as  significant  by  the U.S.  Administration. 
Equally the consternation in Europe  over 
the  present Administration's  Budget deficit 
and  the correspondingly high rates of 
interest would  not have  been a  feature 
in prosperous  times.  But  given the  economic 
recession many  European  leaders regard 
America's  high interest policy as  having a 
most  damaging  effect on Europe.  Indeed 
one  senior French leader recently said 
"The  United States  through  the use of high 
interest rates  is exporting its recession 
to Europe".  So  clearly we  have  to ack-
nowledge  that  the worsening economic 
circumstances are placing strains on the 
Alliance which we  did not experience during 
periods of prosperity. 
But  can I  now  turn Mr.  Chairman to what 
I  regard as  the major.problem facing 
U.S./European relations.  We  are in my 
. I . 
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view facing  a  major crisis of confidence 
and  this stems  from  the way  we  have  begun 
in recent years  to  perceive one another. 
If I  might  somewhat  crudely  summarise it: 
the  present United States Administration 
seem  to  believe that Western Europe  has 
gone  soft on  the Soviet Union and  is an 
unreliable ally in meeting  the  threat of 
international Communism.  This  is  balanced, 
if that is the right phrase,  by  the  view of 
many  European  leaders  that the  United  States 
Government  tends  to make  highly simplistic 
judgements,  is eager for  confrontation and 
expects  its allies to make  unnecessary 
sacrifices.  I  think that all these elements 
are to  be  found  in the recent dispute over  · 
how  to handle  the  situation in Poland.  The 
demands  by  the United States that France 
and  Germany  should cancel  the Siberian 
natural  gas  deal was  seen not as  a  construc-
tive proposal  to  bring effective pressure 
on the  Soviet  Union  but rather as  an action 
that would  only damage  Western European 
interests:  French and  German  commentators 
were  L~ick to point out  that whilst  the· 
Administratiu,\ were ready  to demand  of 
./' '( 
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Europe a  major  <..~t:'·  -r t'ln  of this kind  there 
was  no  suggestion that they would  take 
comparable action such as  terminating 
grain sales  to  the Soviet Union.  In some 
ways  this dispute over  ~he gas  pipeline 
is an excellent example  of h_ .,  _:.  ~r,.,~ ted 
States and  European parties fail to 
understand  the other's point of view.  To 
many  Europeans  it is a  perfectly respectable 
argument  to say that sucking the Soviet 
·  Union  into increasing interdependent 
economic  relations with the West  does  not 
make  the West more  dependent  on  the Soviet 
Union  but rather the reverse.  In the case 
of the gas  pipeline they would  argue it is 
not a  question of Western Europe  becoming 
dependent  on Soviet natural gas,  which  in 
any  event will only comprise.a relatively 
minor  percentage of European energy needs, 
but rather the Soviet Union  coming  to depend 
more  and more  on the foreign currency that 
the  sales of this gas  to Western Europe 
produces.  Indeed  some  European commentators 
./. 
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have used  this argument  in terms  o£ 
justifying continued  sales of U.S.  grain 
to  the Soviet Union.  They  argue  that  the 
more  one  can institutionalise Russi.a's 
inability to  f€ed  itself and  thus  increase 
its dependence  on Western supplies is to 
reduce  the Soviet's ability to act against 
Western interests. 
So  it seems  to many  Europeans  that whilst 
there is a  dispute on how  one  should handle 
the  Polish situation both sides have 
legitimate arguments.  It is however  when 
one  gets  to  the  level of motive  that one 
gets  into mQre  difficult areas.  We  in 
Europe read with considerable interest 
the  leaks  that took place over  the series 
of meetings  Secretary Haig had with his  senic 
officials in the State Department.  Indeed 
I  suspect  that some  of us  felt rather 
superior over  the way  the Americans  seemed. 
to conduct  their affairs through media 
leaks  - that is until we  remember  our  own 
track records  in these matters.  But  the 
thing  that  I  found  alarming about  these 
./ 
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revelations  was  not  that Secretary Haig 
allegedly described  the  Foreign Secretary 
of my  country as  a  duplicitous  bastard  -
after all Peter Carrington is more  than 
capable of looking after himself and  in 
any  event  given Britain  1 s  qua~  ..  '- ut...- .......  ~i··y. 
laws  it is  impossible  for  a  fourth  baron 
to be  illegitimate!  NO:  the really 
serious allegation if true was  Secretary 
Haig's allegation that on Poland  "The· 
·Europeans are cowardly".  To  many  in 
Europe  this  type of remark explicates 
precisely what  we  feel many  in the  present 
Administration think about  Europeans  and 
it is something that is very strongly 
resented. 
We  must  acknowledge  that when  it comes  to 
a  question of how  do we  handle  the Soviet 
Union in the  80s  there is a  real difference 
of opinion within the Alliance.  And  if 
we  are  to resolve this difference  then 
we  simply have got  to  acknowledge  that we 
all pursue the  same  results:  we  all 
accept  the need  to  combat  and defeat 
.  /. 
Soviet Imperialism. 
Soviet  Imperialism.  We  are all committed 
to  the development  of  freedom  and  democ-
racy  in Eastern Europe.  I  know  that there 
i 
are  some  members  of  the  present Adminis-· 
tration who  are genuinely convinced.that 
if the West uses  its economic muscle  then 
it ·can force  the Soviet  Union  into major 
concessions  over  Poland  and ultimately to 
the rest of the satellite countries.  This 
is not  however  a  view that is generally 
subscribed  to  by  European  leaders.  For 
fundamental  to our  thinking is the belief 
that whilst pressure for  change  in Soviet 
bloc  countries must  be  constant and 
unremitting,  it must  be recognised  that 
to achieve  change will necessarily be  a 
long and  gradual  process.  Not  only do 
we  believe that attemps at comprehensive 
economic  sanctions against  the Soviet 
Union are more  likely to precipitate an 
aggressive over-reaction from  the Russians. 
but we  also believe that freedom and 
democracy are more  likely to  come  in these 
C'JUntries  thr.Jugh  the  11dripping of r.;rater 
en a  stone"  J>:J:ocess  than ·through threats 
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or sanctions.  I  kn''y  ··1-tat  many  in the 
present Administration find  this view 
unpalatable and  genuinely believe that 
we  ought  to  be  able  to deter  the Soviet 
Union  from  acts of  adv~ntur~sm and  to bring 
about more  liberal regimes  in Eastern 
Europe.  But  the  trouble with  the real 
what  world  is that;one ought  to be able  to 
do,  and.w~t one can do,. particularly in 
international affairs,  is often two 
quite different things.  I  very much  hope 
Mr.  Chairman that these difficulties and 
doubts  that exist within the Alliance 
·.,;tll  be  given a  fair airing at the  forth-
coming  economic  and  NATO  Summits.  For  I 
remain convinced  that one of the principle 
strengths of the All-iance  ts: the ability 
of.the United States and  Europe  to talk 
honestly and  frankly with one  another.  If 
we  are to resolve  these differences  then 
it will  have  to  be  done  in an open and 
sensible manner. 
./. 
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Can  I  now  briefly turn to a  matter which 
I  know  is of growing  concern to people 
in the United States:  that is the growth 
of sentiments  in favour of nuclear dis-
armament  and neutralism in Europe.  There 
can be  no  doubt  that these  sentiments have 
increased rapidly in recent years and  they 
must  cause great concern to .all :who  __ wish_: 
to maintain the Alliance.  Whilst  I  don't 
want  to overstate the situation we  must 
recognise that this anti-nuclear and  neu-
tralist campaign is not now  simply a  matter 
which  involves college kids and  way-out 
fringe groups.  In the  United Kingdom  both 
the Labour  and  Liberal parties are now 
committed  to a  policy of unilat~ral-nuclear-­
disarmament  and  the anti-nuclear lobby is 
growing  in strength in the  SPD  in Germany. 
Support  for  these policies is also growing 
in most  of the Western European countries. 
I  believe there are a  number  of reasons 
for  this  phenomena.  There  is the latent 
feeling that because we  have managed  to 
avoid  a  war  in Europe  for  almost  four 
decades  that  the  threat to  peace no  longer 
./. 
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exists.  There  is the disappearance Yrom 
the  scene of the Atlantic generation both 
in the United States and  in Europe;  that 
generation that put  together  the Marshall 
Plan,  NATO  and  similar international 
organisations which we  of following gener-
ations  simply take  for  granted.  But  over 
an~-~~d~nd this there is undoubtedly the 
hostility of the young  in Europe  towards 
the United States Government.  Given  th~ 
post-war history of Europe it is astonishing 
how  little effect the contribution that the 
United States made  to ensure  freedom was 
maintained  in Western Europe has  impinged 
upon young  people.  To  them the Marshall 
Plan. and  the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation do  not affect their  judgement 
of  the American Government  to anything like 
the  same  extent as  did  Vietnam and  currently  '~ 
the U.S.  involvement  in Central America. 
The  consequence  of this is that anti-
American  feeling amongst  young  people 
continues  to grow  and  this if it continues 
could  gravely affect the Alliance.  The 
anti-nuclear  campaign  and  the attempts  to 
get Amer-ican  bases out of _Europe  is a 
J'Nc..""  - .  /. 
efte-way street 
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_-Gne-way_~treet_ because it encourages 
elements  in the  United  States  to -beiieve 
that this is the authentic voice of 
European opinion  - which it is not  - and 
encourages  them  in adopting isolationist 
attitudes.  We  simply have  got  to get 
over  to young  people  the real-nature of 
the  ever-present Soviet threat and  to 
create an understanding that the mutual -
defence agreement  which  the Alliance has, 
based on  NATO  and  backed  by  the nuclear 
deterrent,  remains  the vital factor  in the 
maintenance of world  peace.  We  have  got 
to convince  people  that a  policy of 
unilateral nuclear disarmament  and  a 
neutral Western Europe will not bring peace 
but will almost certainly make  war  more 
likely. 
But  in this regard we  hav~ got  to acknowledge 
that we  can only win  the  ideological 
battle againSt  the Soviets if we  can 
demonstrate  that our democratic  system 
is better.  Unfortunately  to many  young 
peopl~ whose  kn(_i'.>lledge  of the Soviet 
. I . 
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Union  is  extreme7./  •·ague  the Western democ-
racies do  not  seetu  t.o  oe  doing a  particularly 
good  job.  Some  weeks  ago  I  talked  to a 
young  unemployed  steel worker  and  when  we 
got  to arguing about  nucl~ar disarmament 
he said  to me  "I don't want  nuclear missiles, 
I  don't want  American  bases:  all I  want  is 
a  job."  It is my  firm belief that both 
in the United States and  in Europe  the 
prospect of long-term unemployment  facing 
so many  of  our  youn~ people is a  major 
factor in driving them  to extreme political 
positions.  If we  give  them  no  hope  of a 
job then we  can't blame  them if they_ become 
"no hopers"  in their attitude to society. 
It is this need  to provide hope  that makes 
one anxious  that the economic  summit"  in 
Versailles,  and  the  following  NATO  Summit 
of Western leaders will be  fruitful.  These 
meetings  provide a  great opportunity for 
our  leaders  to  get  the Alliance  back on 
firmer  foundations.  I  hope  that as well 
./. 
as  being able 
I 
I ... 
16  -
as  being able  to resolve the political and 
strategic difficulties we  are experiencing 
they will also be  able  to  come  to some  broad 
agreement  on how  to  end  the recession.  For 
it is my  conviction that if we  can achieve an 
upturn in economic activity and more 
importantly put our people  back to work  then 
we  can start to move  into a  period of peace 
and prosperity. 
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